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INTERSTATE COMMERCE LAW.
i. Carriers-Discrimination.
The action of a railroad passenger agent in guaranteeing that a theatre
troupe, to whom he sells a party-rate ticket, shall arrive at their destina-
tion at a given time, is not the giving of an undue or unreasonable prefer-
ence or advantage, within the meaning of the interstate commerce law
(24 Stat., 380, P 3): Foster v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Rwy. Co., Circuit
Court, Southern District of New York, WHEELER, D. J., June 15, 1893,
56 Fed. Rep., 434.
PASSENGER'S BAGGAGE.
2. Action by Husbandfor.
Where husband and wife are traveling together over a railway whose
business it is to carry passengers and their baggage, and the husband
purchases the tickets representing the fares of himself and wife, and has
his own and his wife's baggage checked to the point of their destination,
himself receiving tht checks repfesenting the railway's receipts for such
baggage, and the railway company loses or fails to deliver at the agreed
point the trunk thus checked of the wife, containing her wearing apparel
and that of her child, held that, under these circumstances the husband
can, in his own name alone, without joining his wife, maintain an action
for damages upon the contract thus made with him for the &rrage of
himself and wife and their baggage, for the breach thereof by the rail-
way in failing to deliver the baggage of the wife; that in such case,
although the general ownership of the lost trunk and its contents is in
the wife, the husband has such a special ownership therein as will entitle
him to recover, in his own name alone, the value of such lost trunk and
its contents as damages for the breach of the contract made with him for
its safe carriage and delivery. Held, further, that a recovery by the
husband in such case is a complete bar to any subsequent suit upon the
same cause of action that might be instituted by the wife: Jacksonville,
S. A. & H. R. Rwy. Co. v. Mitchell Supreme Court of Florida, T&YLOR,
J., August 15, 1893, 13 So. Rep., 673.
SLEEPING CAR CO.
3. Liability for Mfloney Stolen From Passenger- Who -May
Bring Action.
A sleeping-car company is liable for money stolen from a passenger
by the porter of the car on which he is traveling.
Plaintiff, when about to go on a journey with his.family and some
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
?riends, was given some money by the parents of a lady who had been
put in, his care, with which to'pay her traveling expenses. This he
i laced in his trousers pocket, and it was stolen by the porter of the
sleeping-car during the night. Held, that the money being rightfully
in plaintiff's possession, he was entitled to bring an action for its loss:
-Pullman Trans. Co. v. Gavin, Supreme Court of Tennessee, McAE.ISTR,
J., June 21, 1893, 23 S. W. Rep., 70.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by WLLIAm STRUTHRS BLLIS.
DuE PROCESS 0 LAW.
i. Fencing.
Complainant owned a tract of land which- was valuable solely for
grazing purposes, and from which he derived an income by letting it to
pasture.. At the ti'me he acquired it the law of South Carolina required
all owners of cattle and stock to keep them fenced in, and gave the
owners of lands upon which they might trespass the right to distrain
and impound them. Thereafter the legislature passed an act exempting
thiis land, with other tracts, from the provisions of the law,.the effect of
which was to: require complainant either to fence his whole tract against
'cattle, or to submit to have it trespassed upon, -without redress, by any
cattle whose owners chose to let them run at large. Held, that thig act
is not within the police power of the State, and violates the Federal Con-
stitution, inasmuch as it deprives complainant of his property without
due process of law: Smith v. Bivens, Circuit Court, District of South
Carolina, SIMONTON, D. J., May i9, 1883, 56 Fed. Rep., 352.
INTERSTATE COMMERcE.
2. Sale of Oleomrgarine-Original Package-Agent for For-
eign Manufacturer.
The Pennsylvania Act of May 21, 1885, 3, which prohibits the sale
within the State of oleomargarine as an article of food, applies to retail
sales made by a local agent, who is a resident of said State, for a prin-
cipal residing without the State. Such sales are not made from the fac-
tory, nor under the right which the fact of making confers on the maker;
so that the fact that the store from which the sales are made is the store of
the manufacturer and that the seller is the agent, cannot relieve him from
liability. The situation of the seller, although he is a non-resident, who
has come into the State to embark in business here, is like that of any
other resident, and his business done at his store is State, not interstate,
no matter where the goods may have been obtained.
The mere fact that packages sold within the State of Petinsylvania
were "made, stamped and branded" by defendant's principal, a manu-
facturer residing in a foreign State, is not sufficient to bring the sale
within the exception made and recognized in the case of "original
packages" and within the protection of the interstate commerce doctrine.
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The importer cannot subdivide his packages and dispose of the sev-
eral parts in detail, nor can it be permitted a manufacturer to put up and
send to himself as a merchant, or to a customer, any package and call it
an " original package" because it was put up by a manufacturer out-
side the State; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S., lo0, distinguisheI: Common-
wealth v. Schollenberger, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS, 3.,
July 19, 1893, 27 Aft. Rep., 30 ;.32 V. N. C., 409; 156 Pa., 201.
OBLIGATION OF CONTRACr.
3. City Ordinances-Street Railway Franchise.
An Act of Indiana (Laws 189i, pp. 137-97) conferred upon the city
of Indianapolis the power, by contract, when approved by ordinance of
its common council, to grant franchises to street-car companies. Held,
that'an exercise of this power by the board of public works, with
approval by ordinance of the common council, was a law of the State
within the meaning of Constitution U. S., Art. I, io, forbidding States
to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and that such city
ordinance after acceptance by the corporation, and the expenditure of
large sums on the faith thereof, constitutes a contract protected by said
clause of the Federal Constitution: Citizens' St. R. Co. v. City Ry. Co.,
Circuit Court, District of" Indiana, BAKER, D. J., July II, 1893, 56 Fed.
Rep., 746,
TITLES OF AcTs.
4. Aippropriation-Public Schools Aot Part of Municipal Organ-
ization.
The Act of Alabama (February 7, i893), entitled "An Act to Amend
'an Act to Establish a New Charter for the City of Demopolis,'" pro-
vides, inter alia, that all funds arising under the general laws for liquor
licenses issued to dealers within the city shall be paid over by the pro-
bate judge of the county to the city treasurer, for the support of the
public schools of the city. Held, that the subject of said section was
not clearly expressed in the title as required by the constitution, as the
support of the public schools is not a matter germane to municipal
organization :^ Volf v. Taylor, Supreme Court of Alabama, HARAL-
SON, J., July 27, 1893,-I3 So. Rep., 688.
CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by Liwis LAWRENCE SMITH.
DISSOLUTION.
I. Judgment of Ouster-Receiver.
By Act of April 4, 1872, of Pennsylvania, when judgment of ouster
against a corporation is pronounced by any court of competent jurisdic- -
tion, the Supreme Court or any judge thereof at nisi firius may appoint
a receiver. The Order of Vesta made an assignment which was recorded
under direction of the Court of Common Pleas, of Philadelphia. A judg-
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mert of ouster against the Order was entered by the Common Pleas of
Dauphin County, which also appointed a receiver. The Act of April 26,
1893, was then passed, providing that the court pronouncing judgment
of ouster should have authority to appoint a receiver. The second sec-
tion of this act provided that it should apply to any corporation previously
dissolved, "the' affairs of which have not been settled and adjusted."
'This act was admitted to have been passed for the purpose of affecting
* the case in question. It was held, that a receiver, not being a common
law officer, must be provided for by statute, that the pover was vested in
the Supreme Court by the Act of 1872, andthat the Act of 1893 did not apply
'to a case where another court had assumed jurisdiction of the matter:
Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Order of Vesta, Kennedy's
Appeal, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, MITcHELL, J., July 19, 1893,
- 27 At]. Rep., I4; 33 W. N. C., r; 156 Pa., 531.
DIVIDENDS.
2. Refusal to Declare.
Three men formed a land company with capital of $1500. In less
than a year it had made profits of $4o,ooo. It appeared that two of the
three corporators suppressed, for wrongful purposes, information con-
cerning the business of the concern, withheld dividends and voted inor-
dihatq salaries to themselves. A bill was filed by the third corporator
• against the company and the other stockholders. Held, that while
.generally suits for declaration of dividends must be brought in the
name of the corporation, yet under the circumstances this suit'was
proper. Also that the court would order the directors to declare such
reasonable dividends as the business would warrant, with leave to com-
plainant to come into court for relief from time to time: Laurel Springs
Land Co. v. Fougeray, Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, GAR-
RISON, J., June i9, 1893, 26 AUt. Rep., 886.
FRAUDULENT. CONVEYAN C .
3. To Secure Debts of Officers.
A mortgage by a corporation is fraudulent as to creditors where part
of the amoutt sectred thereby is a loan to one of its officers, and it is
immaterial that the officer applied the money loaned to the payment of
his ivdebtedness to .the corporation, or that part of the amount secured
was a bona fide indebtedness of the corporation: National Tube Works
Co. v. Ring Refrigerating, etc., Co., Supreme Court of Missouri, Div. i,
MACFARLAND, J., June 19, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 947.
INSOLV ENCY.
4. ' When Receiver Will be Appointed.
A Court of Equity has no authority to appoint a receiver for a bene-
ficial association upon allegations of fraud and mismanagement of its
officers, where there is no sufficient allegation of insolvency. And even
were the latter allegations sufficient, it is questionable whether the court
would have the authority: Mason, et al., v. Supreme Court of Equitable
League, Court of Appeals of Maryland, FOWLER, J., June 20, 1893, 27
Atl. Rep., 171.
EQUITY.. I~
I EQUITY.
Cases selected by ROBERT P. BRADFORD.
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS.
I. Adequate Remedy at Law.
Where a bill in equity was filed to restrain the condetnnati6n by
defendant company of a right of crossing for its railroad through the
yard of complainant company, upon motion for a preliminary injunction
to prevent the condemnation commissioners appointed by the State
court from considering a plan of crossing different from that described
in the petition for their appointment, it was held that equity would not
interfere with proceedings before a special statutory tribunal until it has
made a final decision. Also, that an ample legal remedy by certiorari is
open to the complainant: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. National Docks
& N. J. J. C. Ry. Co., United States Circuit Court, District of New Jer
sey, AcirEsoN, C. J., March 28, 1893, 56 Fed. Rep., 697.
INJUNCTION.
2. Restraining Action at Law.
A railroad cbmpany sold an interest in certain cars to a car compadiy,
leasing the remaining interest therein to the car company, and made a
contract with the car company for the operation of the cars by the lat-
ter, with a division of profits. The contract provided that the railroad
company might terminate the lease and should then p ay the car com
pany for its interest in the cars. The railroad company terminated the
lease without paying for the car company's interest. Held, that the
railroad company could not enjoin the prosecution of an action of law
for the value of the car company's interest in the cars, on the ground
that the car company had not fairly divided the profits, the various
branches of-the contract being totally distinct, the bill to surcharge the
accounts in no way attacking the claim'involved in the suit at law;
49 Fed. Rep.,.4og, reversed: Pullman Palace-car Company v. Chicago,
M- & St. P. Ry. Co., Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, JENKYNS
J., May 2, 1893, 56 Fed. Rep.,.756.
3. Trade Mark-Geograpihical Naine-Vichy Mineral Water.
A right may be acquired to use a geographical name as a trade
name in connection with mineral waters derived from springs in that
ocality by persons who own all of such springs, and the use of such
name by others who obtain their waters elsewhere will be enjoined.
The woid "Vichy," used in connection with mineral waters, and
derived from the locality in France where the waters are obtained, is a
trade name, or " nom commercial," within the meaningof the industrial
property treaty with France of 1883, Art. 6 (25 Stat., 1376), and as such
is entitled to protection in the United States, though it has not been
depositedT as requiredby the treaty in the case of trade-marks: La Repub-
lique Francaise v. Schultz, Circuit Court, Southern District of New York,
TOWNSEND, D. J., July 3, 1893, 57 Fed. Rep., 37.
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EVIDENCE.
Cases seleded by HENRY N. SMALTZ.
AcTIoN ON LiAsm.
i. Conlemporaneous Oral Agreement.
In an action on a lease, parol evidence is not admissible to show
that, at the time the lease was made, plaintiffs agreed to make, within a
year, certain. alterations in the demised premises, so as to make them
conform to the 'stipulations of a prior oral agreement made contem-
poraneously with a written contract of lease, in pursuance of which
written contract such lease was executed: Averill v. Lawyer, Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut, FI Nx, J., CARPBNTIR, J., dissenting,
'March 6, 1893, 27 At. Rep., 73.
DIscnZDITING ONE's OwN WiTNEss.
2. When Allowed.
A party who has called a witness in his own behalf, and who is sur-
prised by his adverse testimony, may, in the discretion of the court, be
allowed to show,.after proper preliminary proof, that he had previously
made statements contrary to his testimony: Leloner v. Bryant, Supreme
Court of Minnesota, DicKsoN, J., GiLFir.AN, C. J., dissenting, August
ais 1893, 36 N. W. Rep., 58.
PRUVIOUS CONDITION OF INJURED PERSON.
3. Plhoeiograph.
On the trial of an -action brought to recover for personal injuries
said to have been caused by defendant's negligence, a photograph taken
a ew days prior to the trial, and testified to be "a true and correct pic-
ture and representation of" certain parts of plaintiff's body, was
received in evidence, under objection and exception. The photograph
was not made a part of the record on appeal. Held, that no error was
made to appear: Cooper v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., Supreme Court of
Minnesota, VANDiRBURGH, J., August r, 1893, 56 N. W. Rep., 42.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC' LAW.
Cases selected by MAYNn R. LONGSTRPTH.
CHINnsZ ]XCLUSIoN.
- . Abpeal from Commissioner's Decision.
The right of appeal to a District Court, given by Act of September 15,
1888, 15 (28 Stat., 476), to a Chinese person adjudged bya United States
commissioner to be unlawfully in the United States, is not taken away
by the Geary Act of May 5, 1892 (27 Stat., 25): United States v. Wong
Depken, District Court, Southern District of California, Ross, D. J.,
June 30, 1893, 57 Fed. Rep., 203.
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2. Geary Act-Imprisonment at Hard Labor-Constiutionai
Law.
Imprisonment at hard labor is a punishment rendering a crime for
which it is inflicted "infanious" within the meaning of the Constitution
of the United States, Art. 3, J 2, par. 3, and Amendments 5 and 6, pro-
viding that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on indictment or presentment of a grand juty.
Therefore so much of the Geary Act of May s, 1893, 4"(27 Stat., 25), as
provides for the imprisonment at hard labor of all Chinese persons
adjudged by a commissioner to be unlawfully in the United States, is
unconstitutional and void: United States v. Wong Depken, District
Court, Southern District'of California, Ross, D. J., July 31, 1893, 57 Fed.
Rep., 206.
COPYRIGHT.
3; (a) Filing Copiy of Title of Work- Variance.
The copy of the title of a play, filed to obtain copyright under the Act
of February 3, 1832, was "Under the Gaslight, a Romantic Panorama of
the Streets and Houses of New York." The title of the play published
was, "Under the Gaslight, a Totally Original and Picturesque Drama of
Life and Love in These Times, in Five Acts." Held, that there was no
material variance. The title of the play, within the meaning of the act
-being the name to be given to it by the public, and by those who
might buy and sell it-was "Under the Gaslight," the remaining words
being mere description of the general character of the work, apparently
not intended, and not in fact used, as any part of the title.
(b) Dramatic Compfosition.
A scene in a play represented a person put in peril of his life by
being placed by another on a track over which a railroad train was
momentarily expected to arrive, and so fastened that he could not move
from his dangerous position, and his rescue by a third person who, sur-
mounting various obstacles, succeeded, at the last moment, in releasing
him. It was displayed before the audience by a series of incidents
grouped in a certain sequence, aild realistically presented, but with very
little dialogue. Held, that such combination of dramatic events,
although its success was largely dependent on what was seen, irre-
spective of the dialogue, was a dramatic composition, entitled to protic-
tion under the copyright laws: Daly v. Webster, Circuit Court of Appeals,
Second District, Pti- CURIAM, October 4, 1892, 56 Fed. Rep., 483.
4. Subject of Coyright-Infringement- Photograpih - Litho-
graph.
A photographer, who, by posing, and by the arrangement of lights,
shades and various accessories, produces an artistic photograph of an
actress, representing his ideal of a character which she is accustomed to
impersonate on the stage, is entitled to the protection of the copyright
law.
A lithograph, which, to the eye of the ordinary observer, reproduces
the material parts of a copyrighted photograph, is an infringement,
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although it is not an exact copy, and lacks the artistic excellence of the
,photograph: Falk v. Dohaldson, Circuit Court, Southern District of New
York, TowNSEND, D. J., July 5, 1893, 57 Fed. Rep., 32.
TORTS.
Cases selected by ALEXANDnR DuRBIN LAUER.
AssA&uLT AND BATTERy.
i. Hasler and Servant-Liabilityfor Etifloyi's Act.
The manager of a theatre'is liable for an assault and battery on an
inoffensive patron, made by one employed by him as doorkeeper and
special police: Dickson v. Waldron, Supreme Court of Indiana, How-
AR], J., June 7,1893, 34 N. B. Rep., 503.
2. Privilege-Justification.
'A newspaper article calling a congressional candidate a " perjured
villain," and charging that he had deceived a court of justice by false
swearing, is libelousp erse, and not privileged by the fact of plaintiff's
candidacy.
The fact that a libelous article-on a congressional candidate was
copied by defendant from another newspaper is not a justification, eyen
if defendant acted with the utihost good faith and honest belief in its
truth, and in order to inform the voters. Such matters can only be con-
sidered in disproof of malice, to mitigate damages: Upton v. .Hume'
Supreme Court of Oregon, BBAN, J., July 17, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 81o.
WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Cases selected by MAURICE C-. BELKNAP.
EXECUTORS.
i. Promises by- Consideration -Lien on Insurance Policy-
Wife.
The fact that plaintiff loaned decedent money with which to pay
premiums on a policy of insurance on his life, which was payable to the
latter's wife, gives plaintiff no lien on the policy, nor right of action
against decedent's widow.
-A debt owing by defendant's deceased husband to plaintiff, which is
barrel by limitation, is not such consideration as will support an agree-
ment by her to pay the amount of the debt.
A promise by an executor to look among the papers of deceased for
one belonging to plaintiff, and to surrender it to her, is not sufficient
consideration for a contract: Sullivan v. Sullivan, Supreme Court of
California, VANCI1FF, C., August io, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 862.
